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I;J THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FIRST SEC URI TY BANK OF UTAH, N. A. , )
a corporation,
)

Respondent,
-vsCOLONIAL FORD' me. ,
Case No.

Defendant,
and

15745
------

LEGRANDE L. BELNAP and
DORIS BELNAP,
Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The District Court erred when it denied defendants' Motion
to amend their Answer to include allegations of contractual mistake
and misunderstanding as a defense to plaintiff's Complaint.
The District Court abused its discretion when it denied
defendants' Motion to amend their Answer to include allegations of
contractual mistake and misunderstanding of the parties as a defense
to plaintiff's Complaint.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the contractual responsibility of two
individual defendants for a corporate debt which they allegedly
assumed by written guarantee at the time the corporate obligation
was incurred.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case came to trial on the issue of whether the written
t;u.ffa.ntee signed by the defendants was induced by the fraud of bank
representatives.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendants

mane a Motion for leave to amend their Answer to conform to the
evidence by adding an affirmative defense of mistake and misunderstar'
ing of the parties as a defense to plaintiff's Complaint.

The court

denied the Motion and entered judgment against the defendants in the'
sum oI $33, 236. 80, plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek on this appeal to have the judgment vacateil
and set aside and to have the Supreme Court order that a new trial

b1

held to determine if the written guarantee executed by the defendant;:
should be rescinded because of the mistake and misunderstanding of
the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed this action in the District Court of Salt
Lake County against the defendant, Colonial Ford, Inc., to recover
sums due under a promissory note executed by the corporation on
September 14, 1976.

In a second cause of action, the plaintiffsought

to recover a similar amount from defendants, LeGrande L. Belnap and I
Doris Belnap, on the basis of a written guarantee which they executea
with the corporate note.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Judgment by Default was entered against the corporation
on December 14, 1976, but the individual defendants filed an Answer

alleging that the written guarantee was obtained through the fraud
of corporate agents.

(R.12-13)

The question of the personal

liability of the Belnaps was tried by the court, sitting without a
jury, on February 2, 1978.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the

defendants moved to amend their Answer to conform to the evidence
by including an affirmative defense to the effect that the written
guarantee was based on the mistake and misunderstanding of the parties.
(R.249)

That Motion was denied.

(R.249)

The court then found the

issues in favor of the plaintiff bank and entered judgment against
the defendants for the amount owed by the corporation under the
promissory note.

(R.120)

Although the testimony of defendants' witnesses at the trial
was first designed to prove fraud on t'."1e part of the bank's agent in
obtaining the signatures of the defendants on the guarantee, it also
appeared from the evidence that the execution of the guarantee was
based on the reasonable but mistaken belief of the defendants that
they were signing something else.
Ronald Folkerson was the branch manager at the Sugarhouse
office of First Security Bank in September, 1976.

(R.209) He became

concerned about a sizeable overdraft in the checking account of
Colonial Ford, Inc.

(R.209)

He called defendant Doris Belnap on the

telephone to discuss the overdraft.

(R.209)

He asked her to sign
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- 4 a note and to guarantee the overdraft.

(R. 172)

She refused because

it was a corporate obligation and because her husband and attorney
were both out of town at that time.

(R. 172-3)

He then asked her to

have the attorney get in touch with him when he returned.

(R.173)

Mrs. Belnap later told her attorney about the conversation
with Folkerson and asked him to handle it for her.

(R. 173)

The

attorney met with Mr. Folkerson at the bank office a few days later.

(R. 158-9)

Folkerson suggested that Colonial Ford sign a promissory

note to cover the overdraft, and the attorney agreed to have
officers of Colonial Ford sign such a note.

(R.160)

t~

Mr. Folkerson

also requested that Mr. and Mrs. Belnap execute the note as co-signc1
The attorney refused to do that.

(R.120, 216)

As an alternative,

Folkerson suggested that the Belnaps sign a guarantee for the note.
The attorney again refused because the form used by the bank is un·
conditional and guarantees anything and everything.

(R. 160-1)

The attorney also objected to having the Belnaps sign an outright
guarantee for payment of the overdraft because it was not their
obligation.

(R.169)

However, Belnaps' attorney suggested that

if Folkerson would have the bank's attorney contact him, he wo0d
recommend to the Belnaps that they sign a "guarantee of collection."

(R.161)

The content of such a guarantee was to be worked out

between the attorneys.

(R. 161)

at the meeting held at the bank.

Neither of the Belnaps were present

(R.165)
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- 5 On September 14, 1976, Mr. Folkerson called the Colonial
Ford Company and spoke with Mrs. Belnap.

(R.174)

He insisted that

he come to the dealership that day and get the overdraft covered by a
note.

He stated that he had to have a corporation note because the

audicors were at the bank and the overdraft was causing him some
problems.

(R.

175)

Mrs. Belnap told him that she would consult with her attorney
and then call him back.
was unavailable.

When she called the attorney's office, he

(R.176)

She returned the call to Mr. Folkerson and

told him that she couldn't meet with him that day because the attorney
was unavailable.

Mr. Folkerson told her that he knew the attorney

couldn't be there, but he said he had to have the note.

He told her

that he had prepared the papers in accordance with her attorney's instruc·
tions, and he insisted on completing the transaction that day.

(R.176)

Folkerson said nothing about the personal guarantees in that
telephone conversation.

He merely stated that he had the papers and

he would bring them down to the dealership.

(R.176-7)

After some

discussion, Mrs. Belnap consented that Mr. Folkerson could come to
the agency with the papers later that same afternoon.

(R.177)

When

he arrived at the agency, Mrs. Belnap called her attorney on the
telephone and told him that Mr. Folker son was there with the papers
in his hand.

(R.177)

The attorney was unable to meet with them, and

he had no idea what was in the documents.

(R.163)

However, the

attorney told Mrs. Belnap that if Folkerson would represent to them
that he had prepared the papers in accordance with his discussion
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(R. 1;7)

She advised her husband of the attorney's statement, a~

her husband turned to Mr. Folkerson and as k e d h"im i"f these were the
papers that Mr.

Rothey had instructed him to prepare.

Folkersoo

answered in the affirmative and said that th ey h a d b een prepared as :
instructed by their attorney.

(R.177-8)

In a previous phone call, Mr. Folkerson had told Mrs. Beln;

that he knew that her attorney wouldn't let her or her husband guararJ
the note because it was a corporate obligation and was not her persor
obligation.

Because of this, Mrs. Belnap was not concerned

ing a personal guarantee.

aboot~

(R.177)

Based on the representation made by Mr. Folkerson regardin:
the preparation of the papers, Mr. and Mrs. Belnap signed the papers.
(R. 178)

At that time,

the Belnaps thought they were signing a docume:

that had been negotiated by their corporate and personal attorney~
had been prepared in accordance with his instructions.

(R.180) The),

didn't read the document because Mr. Folkerson told them that it had

been prepared in accordance with their attorney's instructions. (R.fr'

Mrs. Belnap would not have signed the document without the Folkerson'
representation.

(R.181, 191)

She never intended to sign a personal

guarantee of a corporate obligation.

(R.184)

Mr. Belnap also relied upon the Folker son representation.
Except for Mr. Folkerson' s assurance that the papers had been agreed

1

upon by his attorney, Mr. Belnap never would have signed those papen
on that date or at any other time.

(R.197)

He never read the d~~

9
·
and he relie d so 1 e 1 y upn t h e representation
ma d e b y Folkerson. (R.l ;

· Museum
d the
(R.ir
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- 7 ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND
THEIR ANSWER TO INCLUDE ALLEGATIONS
OF CONTRACTUAL MISTAKE AND MISUNDERSTANDI:~G AS A DEFENSE TO PL\INTIFF' S
COMPL\INT
Rule lS(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, deals with
amendments to conform to the evidence and reads as follows:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties
they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment; but failure to so amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence."
In construing and applying this rule, the Supreme Court has
held that it has two separate parts.

The first part is applicable

when issues not raised in the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, and the second part is applicable
where a motion to amend is made in response to an objection by the
opposing party to the introduction of evidence.

In the first case

the court has no discretion and it must allow the amendment.

Only

in the
second
case
the
court
determine
whether
prejudice,
undue
ponsored
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- 8 delay or laches ought to prevent the amendment.

See General

Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dvnasty Corp., 545 P2dy
In the cited case,

the trial court had denied defendant's

motion to amend his answer to include lack of consideration as an
affirmative defense.

The motion was made to conform defendant's

pleadings to the evidence after witnesses had testified that the
indemnity agreement relied upon by the pla.intiff had been obtainea
from defendant as an afterthought long after the original bondi~
agreement had been signed by the primary obligor.

Because the

evidence on which the motion was based was introduced without
objection from the plaintiff, the court ruled that the issue was
tried by implied consent.

Relying on its construction of Rule lS(t

:ceferred to above, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's
refusal to allow the proposed amendment was error and sent the case,
back for a new trial.

The court reasoned that Rule 15 (b) mandatea

the trial court to grant the motion under the circumstances of that
case.
In the action now before the court, similar circumstances
were before the trial court when a similar motion was .denied.
out objection from the plaintiff,

Witr.

the defendants testified that whi:,

they executed their personal guarantee of a corporate obligatioo,
they mistakenly believed that they were signing something else.

~

facts brought out at the trial strongly support their assertions in,
this regard.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 9 -

When the Branch Manager at plaintiff's Sugarhouse Office
contacted Mrs. Belnap about a sizeable overdraft in the checking
account of Colonial Ford, Inc., she refused to sign a note to guarantee the corporate obligation.

Then she turned the matter over to her

attorney for a final determination.

When the attorney met with bank

representatives, he agreed that the corporation would sign a note to
cover the overdraft, but he expressly refused to have Mr. and Mrs.
Belnap execute the note as co-signers.

Hhen bank personnel suggested

as an alternative that the Belnaps sign a guarantee, the attorney
again refused because the form used by the bank is unconditional in
nature.

The attorney also objected to the guarantee for payment

because the obligation was that of the corporation.
The testimony also revealed that defendants' attorney would
recommend that they sign some kind of a guarantee if a satisfactory
document could be worked out between the attorneys.

Neither of the

Belnaps were present at the meeting held at the bank, and they left
the details to their own attorney.
Without any consultation between the attorneys, plaintiff's
representative called the Colonial Ford Company and insisted that the
overdraft be covered by a note.

Defendants' attorney could not meet

with them on that date, but he advised Mrs. Belnap that if the bank
representative would represent to them that the papers to be signed
had been prepared in accordance with their attorney's instructions,
then they should go ahead and sign them.

The bank representative
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- 10 ~ade that representation, and the documents •,·.•ere execute d without

being read by the defendants.

The attorney also had no knowledge,:

their contents.

the Belnaps thought they were s1gni:
·

At that time,

a document that bad been negotiated by their corporate and personai
I

attorney and had been prepared in accordance with his instructions
They never intended to sign a personal guarantee of a corporate~
gation.

They thought they were signing a document, which, in fact.
1

was non-existent.
The evidence clearly showed that the defendants were mistit
when they signed the document upon which their liability was based:
the conclusion of the evidence, their counsel moved to amend their
Answer to conform to that evidence.
the court.

That motion was abruptly deniu

That ruling was in error because under Rule lS(b) theh

of mistake of the parties had already been tried by implied consent'
Under the interpretation of the Rule made by the court in General
Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp. , Supra., t"·'
granting of the motion was mandatory.

Denial of the motion was err:•

eous, and the case should be remanded to the court for a new tti~
In support of the trial court's ruling on defendants' m~k
to amend, plaintiff will undoubtedly argue that Rule 8 (c), Utah Ruli'
of Civil Procedure, requires that affirmative defenses be ple~~·
that failure to do so is fatal to any such defense.

The Supreme(i;

· Ch eney v. Rucker, 14 U2d 205, 381 PZd
faced this same argument in

111

(1963), where the court stated that the rules must be considered in,
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- 11 the light of their purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure when resolving any discrepancy in their content.

The language

of the court in the Cheney case, all of which appears to be applicable
to the matter now before the court, reads as follows:
"Plaintiff also raises the procedural point
that since defendants did not plead the subsequent
agreement as an affirmative defense, they should
not have been permitted to rely thereon. It is true,
as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), U. R. C. P.,
requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded. It
is a good rule whose purpose is to have the issues
to be tried clearly framed. But it is not the only
rule in the book of Rules of Civil Procedure. They
must all be looked to in the light of their even more
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and
procedure to the end that the parties are afforded
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this
is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our
rules provide for liberality to allow examination
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue
if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states.
It further allows for an amendment to conform to the
proof after trial or even after judgment, and indicates
that if the ends of justice so require, 'failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.' This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c)(l),
U.R.C.P.: '[E]very final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings.'
Although the plaintiff did object to evidence on
the issue of subsequent agreement, when it was overruled, he made no request for a continuance nor did he
make any representation to the court that h7 was t~ken
by surprise or otherwise at a disadvant~ge in meeting_
that issue. The trial court not only did not abuse his
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- 12 discretion in allowing the issue to be raised and
receivi~f the contr~ct in evidence, but he would
have fai ed the lain mandate of ·ustice had he
refused to do so.
Emphasis applie
POINT NO.

II

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND
THEIR ANSWER TO INCLUDE ALLEGATIONS OF co:;TRACTUAL MISTAKE AND MISUNDERSTANDING OF
THE PARTIES AS A DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT
If the court should determine in its deliberations that•
question of whether defendants should be allowed to amend their Am;
to conform to the proof was a matter within the discretion of the
court, then defendants further assert that such discretion was abus:
in this instance.
As noted above,

the second part of Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, is applicable where a motion to amend is made

r

response to an objection by the opposing party to the introduction'
evidence.

Although such an objection was not forthcoming in thisc'

the cases cited under this rule show that any discretion of the c:I
allowed in determining motions to conform to the evidence should be
exercised liberally and in the interest of justice.

See Cheney.2:_

Rucker, Supra.; General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero
Dynasty Corp., Supra.; and Morris v. Russell, 120 U 545, 236P2d4i
Rule 54(c) (1) requires that every final judgment shall gr'
·I
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entli
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- 13 even if the party has not demanded such relief in its pleadings.

The

Supreme Court declared in Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 U2d 297,
452 P2d 325, that this rule indicates that there shall be liberality
of procedure to reach the result which justice requires.
The Supreme Court has shown this liberality in construing the
rule as it concerns amendments to the pleadings during the trial.

In

Buehner Blnck Company v. Glezos, 6 U2d 226, 310 P2d 517, the court
allowed an unpleaded partnership issue to be determined at trial where
it was not objected to by the defendant and both sides went into the
facts of the partnership during the testimony at the trial.
The court ruled in Cheney v. Rucker, Supra., that the trial
court properly allowed the pleadings to be amended and an affirmative
defense to be included as an issue where the opposing party made no
request for a continuance and made no representation to the court that
he was taken by surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage in meeting the
issue.

cou-:::t also noted that dlthough Rule 8(c) requires that

affirmative defenses be pleaded, that rule must be ruled in the light
of the fundamental purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure of liberalizing the requirements of pleading and procedure so that parties can
properly

present their legitimate contentions in one proceeding.
The Supreme Court noted in General Insurance Company of

America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., Supra., that the purpose of the
amendment to conform to the proof is to bring the pleadings in line
with the actual issues upon which the case was tried.
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- 14 Keeping in mind the liberality of the court in these mat
we turn to the issues of this case.

The defendants are alleging tL

the >;uarantee that they signed should be rescinded because of thei:
c,nilateral mistake.
of signature.

They had not seen the papers prior to the tiii

They didn't read them at that time because they

uL

upon Mr. Folker son's representation to them that the papers had ber
prepared in accordance with the instructions of their own attorney
Thev believed that they were signing something that was non-exister
at that time.

Both the defendants and their attorney had advisedt

bank that they would not sign a promissory note or give an unlimit<.
guarantee to the bank.

They had no intention to do so when the dor

ment was signed.
The Supreme Court of Utah has had prior occasion to deal
with the contractual defense of unilateral mistake.
Charlesworth,

In Ashw~

119 U 650, 231 P2d 724, the court stated the general

rule in such matters by quoting from an annotation in 59 ALR 809 as
follows:
"Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is
frequently given by a reformation of the contract.
But a contract will not be reformed for a unilateral
mistake.
Equitable relief may, however, be given
from a unilateral mistake by a rescission of the
contract.
Essential conditions to such relief are
(1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence
that to enforce the contract as actually made would
be unconscionable.
(2) The matter as to which the
mistake was made must relate to a material feature
of the contract.
(3) Generally the mistake must have
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary
diligence by the party making the mistake.
(4~ I~
must be possible to give relief by way of rescission
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- 15 without serious prejudice to the other party
except the loss of his bargain. In other words,
it must be possible to put him in statu quo."
The above language was adopted as the law of Utah in the
cited case and has been subsequently quoted and followed in the case
of Davis v. Mulholland, 25 U2d 56, 475 P2d 835.
When applying the facts of this case to the standards set
forth above, we find that the defense of unilateral mistake would
clearly be applicable to the Belnap circumstances.

The first condi-

tion listed above is that the mistake must be so grave a consequence
that to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscionable.

The amount involved in this action exceeds $40,000.00.

If the

Belnaps were required to pay this amount from their personal funds
and assets, it would be a great burden to them.

On the other hand,

the plaintiff can still look to the corporation for satisfaction of
its prior judgment for the overdraft amount.

As was stated on several

occasions during the trial of the case, the overdraft obligation was
that of the corporation and not that of its individual stockholders.
The purpose of organizing the corporation in the first place was to
insulate the stockholders from personal liability.

It was also

pointed out during the trial that the overdraft came from corporate
activities and not from any personal loans or transactions made by
its officers or these defendants.
corporate obligation.

The note was given to cover a

It would certainly be unconscionable to

require the Belnaps to pay this amount unless they knowingly accepted
that obligation.
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- 16 The second condition stated above requires that the mist;
must relate to a material feature of the contract.

Th e materialit;

the guarantee is self-evident here and need not be discussed at~
great length.
The third requirement is th.Jt the mis take must have occurr
despite the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the Belnaps. i
is the only requirement that might give the court trouble
It is conceded that the Belnaps did not read the guarantee
signed it.

in~~~
befu~f

However, they were relying upon the representation oft

bank representative to the effect that the document had been prepar'
in accordance with the instructions of their attorney.

They

were~

even aware of what those instructions were, and reading the contract.
wouldn't have given them great enlightenment in this regard.

They

were following the advice of their own counsel and relying upon the
representations of the bank manager when they signed the document.
It certainly isn't negligence to rely upon the advice of your own
counsel and to accept the word of an important officer of the bank.
Mrs. Belnap had expressly refused to sign a blanket guarantee or
even co-sign on the promissory note.

She had no

reason to believe

that the bank officer would present papers that achieved the very •
thing she had refused to do in the first place.
The fourth requirement of unilateral mistake is that the
court can give relief by way of rescission without serious prejudice
to the other party except the loss of his bargain.

In this instance
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- 17 it should be remembered that the bank has a judgment by default
against the corporation.
~ollectable

This judgment is fully effective and

by normal means.

The corporation owns a large piece of

property that is to some degree subject to the corporate obligations.
The plaintiff's interests would not be seriously prejudiced by a
judgment for the defendants on the question of personal liability.
In refusing to grant the Motion to amend to conform to the
evidence, the court abused its discretionand denied the defendants
their normal rights under the procedures of the court.

A reversal

of the trial court's decision is mandatory in this instance.

CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above, the court should reverse the
trial court's decision and remand the matter for further proceedings
and for a new trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

!ef~~~

Attorney for Appellants
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NOTICE OF MAILING
Mailed two copies of this Erief to Respondent's attom~
Steven H. Gunn, 400 Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,

b:'

l:nited States Mail, postage prepaid, this

7 //--

day of Septemb

1978.
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